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Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, by Robert C. Roberts.
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 357. $70.00 (Cloth), $25.00 (Paper).
NANCY E. SNOW, Marquette University
This book is the first part of a projected two-volume study of the emotions
and their place in moral personality. The volume is ambitious, densely
written, and thoroughly argued. Since Roberts' primary concern is to use
conceptual analysis to elucidate the nature and moral import of emotions,
in chapter one he defends conceptual analysis against critics. In chapter
two, he develops his own theory of the nature of emotions. He applies the
theory to many particular emotions in chapter three. Chapter four closes
the book with an exploration of assorted topics, such as error in emotion,
emotions and feelings, emotions and the self, true and false emotions, emotions and literature, and emotional education.
In chapter one, Roberts describes conceptual analysis as " ... particularly based on collection of and reflection about examples from everyday
human life, many of which can only be understood in the light of a fairly
rich narrative background" (p. 5). He defends this method of understanding emotions against two lines of attack, one from Amelie O. Rorty and
another from Paul E. Griffiths (among others). The upshot of the
labyrinthine analysis of Rorty's view is that emotion is a wide-ranging and
complex topic. According to Roberts, a useful understanding of emotion
should explain why some concepts, such as anger and fear, are paradigm
cases of what English speakers regard as emotion, whereas notions like
surprise and startle are marginal cases (see p. 14).
An examination of the second line of criticism of conceptual analysis follows the laborious treatment of Rorty. The second criticism comes from
those who believe that emotion should be understood in scientific terms.
Roberts' arguments about purely scientific analyses of emotions are genuinely helpful in ferreting out useful methodological approaches to a truly
complex topic. Roberts' arguments lead him to the commonsense conclusion that emotions are best studied from a variety of disciplinary angles
(see p. 36). Though Roberts endorses conceptual analysis, he is also aware
of its limitations (see pp. 57-9).
In chapter two, he uses conceptual analysis to develop his own theory of
emotions. Before turning to the substance of the view, two preliminary
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points are in order. First, Roberts offers a disclaimer of sorts by calling his
view an 'understanding,' as opposed to a 'theory' of the emotions (see p.
182). This seems a trifle disingenuous, for he clearly intends his "understanding" of emotion to compete with other philosophical theories of emotion. His "understanding" is theory-like in several respects: he argues that
it's superior to other "theories," such as various views about the roles that
judgments play in emotions; he develops terminology specific to his view; he
offers "paradigm cases" of emotions that are well explained by his approach;
and acknowledges that some emotions are not fully captured by his outlook.
Second, the style of the first few sections of chapter two is tedious. The
first section begins with a dozen facts about emotion. These are numbered
E1-E12. In the important section on construals, the reader encounters nine
numbered sections, and a summary of twelve important points about construals, numbered C1-C12. One of the sections on judgments contains features of the nature of judgments, numbered J1-J6. Perhaps these lists were
an attempt by the author to communicate efficiently, but the reader is
grateful to see them disappear as chapter two progresses.
According to Roberts, emotions are concern-based construals (see p. 79).
He writes: "A construal is a perceptual event or state in which one thing is
grasped in terms of something else" (p. 76). A construal is a construction
of various elements (see p. 78), or a characterization of how objects present
themselves (see p. 80). Later Roberts indicates that emotions are a subclass
of construals, or a certain kind of construal (see p. 101). Though he argues
against the views that emotions are constituted by judgments or require
judgments, he contends that many, though not all, emotions have propositional content (see p. 107ff). He writes:
A sentence expressive of an instance of emotion and referring to the
particular items in the emotion's situational object I will call the emotion's material proposition. The various material propositions expressive of instances of a given type of emotion (say, resentment or nostalgia) should have a form in common. A sentence expressing this
form I will call an emotion's defining proposition (p. 110; italics his).
An example is the defining proposition for anxiety: "X vaguely presents an
aversive possibility of some degree of probability; may X or its aversive consequences, whatever they may be, be avoided" (p. 110; italics his).

Material propositions of a construal can depict valuational features of a
situation. This, however, is not enough for a construal to be an emotion.
According to Roberts: "Insofar as the material proposition is that of an emotion, its value elements must express a concern of the subject, and this concern has to connect with or enter into the rest of the construal as one of its
terms" (p. 111; italics his).
What, then, are concerns? The answer is neither simple nor entirely
clear. Roberts claims: "I use 'concern' to denote desires and aversions,
along with the attachments and interests from which many of our desires
and aversions derive. Concerns can be biological ('instinctive') or learned,
general or specific, ultimate or derivative, and dispositional or occurrent"
(p.142). Some concerns are desires, but some aren't (see p. 143). Moreover,
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there can be basic concerns and consequent concerns; bipolar concerns and
unipolar concerns (see p. 144). Basic concerns are what Roberts calls
"exogenous" causes of emotions, that is, causes that are not parts or aspects
of an emotion (as opposed to "analytic" causes of emotion, which are part
of the experience of the emotion; see p. 133). Yet basic concerns can also be
"taken up" into a construal, to become part of an emotion.
Roberts deploys other technical notions, such as the idea of a "term" of a
construal, in the explanation of his view. These ideas are complex and, at
times, elusive, and he rightly spends considerable time and effort sifting
through them. The concept of a concern, so crucial to his understanding of
emotion, is especially hard to pin down, but essen1.ial to Roberts' view of
emotion as both conative and cognitive (see p. 178).
Chapter three is a lengthy analysis of specific emotions. The main task is
to identify defining propositions for emotions and emotion types. Roberts
recognizes that some of the defining propositions he identifies are debatable
(see p. 192; p. 218). For example, the defining proposition for anger has a lot
of embedded cognitive and evaluative content: "5 has culpably offended in the
important matter of X (action or omission) and is bad (is to some extent an enemy of
what is good); I am in a moral position to condemn; 5 deserves (ought) to be hurt for
X; may 5 be hurt for X" (p. 204). To me, this seems more appropriate as defining justifiable anger than as defining anger in general. Further, one would
think that defining propositions of similar or closely related emotions
would be similar in form and content. Yet, the defining propositions of
resentment and an emotion that he calls "impersonal resentment" differ not
only in form but also in content, since resentment expresses a desire to hurt
some culpable offender, whereas "impersonal resentment" does not express
the desire to harm, but the desire to be compensated by some presumably
culpable "System" (see pp. 214-15).
A deeper issue, I believe, is that the content of defining propositions
seems heavily culturally influenced and thus, culturally relative. Roberts
addresses this concern by asking whether emotions found among the
Haluk and Ilongot (groups living near or in the Philippines) are fear or
anger. His general conclusion is that his approach to emotions can help us
to understand when emotions found in other cultures correspond to emotions found in ours, and when they differ. This is useful, provided that the
defining propositions of emotions found in our culture are accurate and
can be reasonably generalized across cultures.
Chapter four concludes the volume with an examination of assorted
topics. They include, among others, the distinction between emotions and
feelings - the feeling and the emotion are two aspects of one mental state
(see p. 60; p. 322) - an explanation of the difference between true and false
feelings, and truth criteria for feelings. Some of the arguments presented
in this chapter seem counterintuitive. For example, in his treatment of false
feelings, Roberts claims: "On this book's account of emotion a construal is
not an emotion unless it is based on an appropriate concern ... " (p. 330).
This invites the question, "What counts as an appropriate concern?" It is
difficult for the reader to arrive at a clear answer. Roberts suggests that an
appropriate concern results in motivation, at least for some emotions, such
as indignation (see p. 330; pp. 335-36). He writes: "Thus lack of proper
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motivation is, for these emotions, a strong indicator that the emotion itself
is absent. If the individual feels it, nevertheless, the feeling is a sham" (p.
330). I find this puzzling. Why can't someone feel mildly indignant over
some slight, yet remain unmotivated to act, perhaps because of resignation
or forbearance? I would say that such indignation is mildly felt, yet genuine - not a sham.
Readers can judge for themselves the merits of Roberts' positions. Let
me conclude with a final observation. I found several of his examples to be
politically charged and, at times, offensive. For example, in discussing
anger, he tells a (presumably imaginary) story about a colleague suggesting that Roberts be given last choice of upper division courses because
Roberts is
nothing but a middle-aged white protestant male ... " (p.
60). A woman's unusual rage at a man is explained by reference to her
monthly menstrual cycle - this is supposed to illustrate that emotions presuppose a background of normal neurochemical functioning (see p. 134).
Horror is illustrated by asking the reader to consider A wastebasket of
human fetuses, some whole and some in parts ... " (p. 202). He continues:
... it is even more horrifying if one of them is still moving" (p. 202).
Perhaps I am being too sensitive about these examples (my monthly
cycle?), but their content distracts the reader from Roberts' main points,
which could easily have been made using other cases. To me, these illustrations mar an otherwise impressive philosophical contribution.
II
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Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions by Martha C.
Nussbaum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 751 pages, inc.
index. $39.95, cloth.
GENE FENDT, University of Nebraska
"'Is that what grief is, then?" I said, A malfunction?"'!
II

Upheavals of Thought is as long and varied as a Russian novel. Fortunately,
one does not have to read it straight through for fear of losing track of the
characters. Fruitfully, I took up the assignment of this review at the same
time that I picked up David Lodge's novel, Thinks ... , in which a female novelist, Helen Reed, is dealing, as Professor Nussbaum while writing her
book, with that emotion-lisa excessive, so disproportionate to any possible
evolutionary payoff" (Lodge, 69)-we pin down in the five letters of grief.
Helen Reed faces her grief against a former philosopher entirely transformed into an adulterous director of an AI institute. Martha Nussbaum
faces hers in the company of the Stoics and Proust, Joyce and Whitman,
and against Plato, Dante, Augustine and others. The Lodge novel and the
scholarly book make the reader consider several thought experiments from
quite different angles; the novel performs, the scholarly book represents
and argues; I ruminate: perhaps the scholarly book performs as well ....
Nussbaum's continuing project is to develop and implement what she
calls a "cognitive/evaluative" theory of the emotions (3), a theory which,
accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality" (129) will show how
II

